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It is widely recognised that while expenditures on research and development are important inputs to 
successful innovation, these are not the only inputs. Further, rather than viewing innovation as a 
linear process, recent work on innovation in business and economics literatures characterises it as a 
complex and interactive process involving multiple feedbacks. These considerations imply that 
relevant indicators for innovation need to do more than capture material inputs such as R&D 
expenditures and human capital inputs.  
The main contribution of this paper is to develop EU-wide aggregate measures that are used to 
explore at the level of national innovation systems the relation between innovation and the 
organisation of work. In order to construct these aggregate measures we make use of micro data 
from two European surveys: the third European survey of Working Conditions and the third 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3). Although our data can only show correlations rather than 
causality they support the view that how firms innovate is linked to the way work is organised to 
promote learning and problem-solving. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely recognised that while expenditures on research and development and the skills of 
scientists and engineers with third-level training are important inputs to successful innovation, these 
are not the only inputs. Developing new products and services also depends critically on the skills 
developed by employees on-the-job in the process of solving the technical and production-related 
problems encountered in testing, producing, implementing and marketing new products and 
processes. Developing these sorts of skills in turn depends not just on the quality of formal 
education, but also on having the right organisational structures and work environments. Work 
environments need to be designed to promote learning through problem solving and to encourage 
the effective use of these skills for innovation.  
 
Further, rather than viewing innovation as a linear process, recent work on innovation in business 
and economics literatures characterises it as a complex and interactive process involving multiple 
feedbacks between different services and functions as well as manifold interactions with customers 
and suppliers (Freeman 1986; Lundvall 1988; Rosenberg 1982; Kline and Rosenberg, 1985; 
Nonaka, 1994). The development of new products and processes will depend not only on the 
resources allocated directly to R&D and design work. Innovating producers need to interact and 
learn from early adopters within or outside the innovating organisation. Factors that block or slow 
down innovation may be located down-stream and reflect rigid organisational frameworks that give 
limited incentives for employees to take part in and contribute to the innovation process.   
 
These considerations imply that relevant indicators for innovation need to do more than capture 
material inputs such as R&D expenditures and human capital inputs such as the quality of the 
available pool of skills based on the number of years of education. Indicators also need to capture 
how these material and human resources are used and whether or not the work environment 
promotes the further development of the knowledge and skills of employees. Despite the wide 
acceptance of these views, there exists very little quantitative survey-based research focussing on 
organisational environments that promote learning and innovation.
1 To our knowledge, there exist 
no EU-wide studies of this nature. 
 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is work based on the DISKO survey for Denmark. See Laursen and Foss, 2003; Nielsen and 
Lundvall, 2006; and Jensen et al., 2005. 
  1The main contribution of this paper is to develop a set of EU-wide aggregate measures that are used 
to explore at the level of national innovation systems the relation between innovation and the 
organisation of work. In order to construct these aggregate measures we make use of micro data 
from two European surveys: the third European survey of Working Conditions carried out at the 
level of employees by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Working Conditions in the 
15 EU member countries in 2000; and the third Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3) carried out 
at the firm-level in 2001 by each of the 15 member nations and referring to innovation activities 
between 1998 and 2000. The survey data on working conditions are used to develop what we 
believe to be the first EU-wide mapping of the adoption of different types of organisational 
practices and policies. The innovation survey data are used to develop a typology of innovation at 
the firm level and to calculate the distribution of these innovation types within each of 14 EU 
countries for which data are available. Although our data can only show correlations rather than 
causality and are aggregated at the national level, they support the view that how firms innovate is 
linked to the way work is organised to promote learning and problem-solving.
2
 
Specifically, we find that in nations where work is organised to support high levels of discretion in 
solving complex problems firms tend to be more active in terms of endogenous innovation, i.e. 
innovation developed, at least to some degree, in house. In countries where learning and problem-
solving on the job are more constrained, and little discretion is left to the employee, firms tend to 
engage in a supplier-dominated innovation strategy. Their technological renewal reflects, almost 
exclusively, absorption of innovations developed elsewhere. Our results challenge some of the 
established ideas and they raise new questions about the link between work organisation, learning 
and innovation. For example, they raise doubts about whether the use of such organizational 
practices such as job rotation and teamwork are relevant indicators for how far firms engage in 
learning and innovation. It would be worthwhile to obtain disaggregated data to explore this and 
other issues in much greater depth. 
 
Our analysis may be seen as contributing also to the literature on national systems of innovation. 
The systematic relations we observe between the organisation of work and innovation suggest that 
the way work is organised should be seen as a layer below the observed ‘technological 
infrastructure’ that is sometimes assumed to structure the innovation system. While differences in 
the technological infrastructure may be useful to characterise innovation systems, the underlying 
                                                 
2 Of course, as with any comparative study based on survey questions that may be interpreted differently in different 
nations, there is a need to be careful in generalizing from the results. 
  2structure of how people work and learn may be both more fundamental and more deeply rooted in 
the national institutional framework. Attempts to benchmark innovation policies in order to locate 
‘best practise’ may only give a view of the tip of the iceberg and they may therefore lead to 
mistaken conclusions. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the variables used to characterise work 
organisation in the 15 countries of the European Union and presents the results of a factor analysis 
and a hierarchical clustering used to construct a typology of forms of work practice. Section 3 
examines differences in the relative importance of these forms across the EU, controlling for the 
effects of sector, firm size and occupational category. Section 4 presents the data used to construct 
the typology of innovation modes developed by Arundel and Hollanders (2005) in cooperation with 
Eurostat.
3 Section 5 uses the two typologies to examine, at the national level, the relation between 
the organisational practices adopted in a nation and its distribution of innovation modes. Section 6 
considers how different aspects of a nation’s social and institutional setting may influence the forms 
of work organisation adopted and the implications of this for innovation. The concluding section 
considers some of the main implications of the research for European policy. 
 
2. Measuring forms of work organisation in the European Union
4
In order to map the forms of work organisation adopted by firms across the European Union we 
draw on the results of the third European Survey of Working Conditions undertaken by the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
5 The survey 
questionnaire was directed to approximately 1500 active persons in each country with the exception 
of Luxembourg with only 500 respondents. The total survey population is 21703 persons, of which 
17910 are salaried employees. The survey methodology is based on a ‘random walk’ multi-stage 
random sampling method involving face-to-face interviews undertaken at the respondent’s principal 
residence. The analysis presented here is based on the responses of the 8081 salaried employees 
working in establishments with at least 10 persons in both industry and services, but excluding 
agriculture and fishing; public administration and social security; education; health and social work; 
and private domestic employees.  
 
                                                 
3 Results for the UK were provided by the Department of Trade and Industry and results for Denmark by the Danish 
Centre for Studies in Research and Research Policy. 
4 This section draws extensively on Lorenz and Valeyre, 2005. 
5 The initial findings of the survey are presented in a European Foundation report by D. Merllié and P. Paoli [2001]. 
  3The choice of variables for the analysis is based on a reading of two complementary literatures 
which address the relation between the forms of work organisation used by firms and the way they 
learn and innovate: the ‘high performance work system’ literature dealing with the diffusion of 
Japanese-style organisational practices in the US and Europe (Dertouzos, et. al. 1989; Gittleman et 
al. 1998; Osterman, 1994 and 2000; Ramsay et al., 2000; Truss, 2000; and Wood,1999) and the 
literature dealing with the relation between organisational design and innovation (Lam, 2005; Lam 
and Lundvall, 2006, Mintzberg, 1979, 1983). The ‘high performance’ literature focuses on the 
diffusion of specific organisational practices and arrangements that are seen as enhancing the firm’s 
capacity for making incremental improvements to the efficiency of its work processes and the 
quality of its products and services. These include practices designed to increase employee 
involvement in problem-solving and operational decision-making such as teams, problem-solving 
groups and employee responsibility for quality control. Many of the practices identified in this 
literature were innovations developed by large Japanese automobile and electronics firms in the 
1970s and 1980s, and some authors refer specifically to the diffusion of the ‘lean production’ model 
associated with Toyota. (Womack, John and Roos, 1990; MacDuffie and Pil, 1997). The diffusion 
of these Japanese-style organisational practices is seen as having contributed to the progressive 
transformation of more hierarchically structured firms that relied Taylor’s principles of task 
specialisation and a clear distinction between the work of conception and execution.  
 
While the high performance literature makes a dichotomous distinction between hierarchical and 
flexible or 'transformed' organisations, the organisational design literature has tended to develop 
more complex taxonomies. For example, Mintzberg (1983), within the context of a broad 
distinction between bureaucratic and organic organisations, identifies two types of organic 
organisation with a high capacity for adaptation: the operating adhocracy and the simple 
organisation. The forms of work organisation and types of work practices that characterise these 
two organic forms are quite different. The simple form relies on direct supervision by one 
individual (typically a manager) and a classic example of this type of organisation is the small 
entrepreneurial firm. Adhocracies rely on mutual adjustment in which employees coordinate their 
own work by communicating informally with each other. Various liaison devices such as project 
teams and task forces are used to facilitate the process of mutual adjustment. While autonomy in 
work is low in the simple organisation it is high in the adhocracy.  
 
  4In contrast to these 'organic' forms, Mintzberg identifies two basic bureaucratic forms with a limited 
capacity for adaptation and innovation: the machine bureaucracy and the professional bureaucracy.
6 
The key characteristic of work organisation in the former is the standardization of jobs and tasks 
through the use of formal job descriptions and rules imposed by management. Thus there is a high 
degree of centralisation and limited employee discretion over how work is carried out or over the 
pace of work. In the professional bureaucracy, on the other hand, centralisation is low and 
behaviour is regulated and standardised through the acquisition of standardised skills and the 
internalisation of professional norms and standards of conduct. As a result operating procedures are 
quite stable and routinized despite considerable autonomy in work.  
 
Lam (2005) in a recent synthesis and extension of these two literatures contrasts two ideal 
organisational forms that support different styles of learning and innovation: the ‘operating 
adhocracy’ and the ‘J-form’.
7 She observes that the operating adhocracy relies on the expertise of 
individual professionals and uses project structures to temporarily fuse the knowledge of these 
experts into creative project teams that carry out innovative projects typically on behalf of its 
clients. High levels of discretion in work provide scope for exploring new knowledge and 
adhocracies tend to show a superior capacity for radical innovation. Compared to the operating 
adhocracy, the J-form is a relatively bureaucratic form that relies on formal team structures and 
rules of job rotation to embed knowledge within collective organisation. Stable job careers within 
internal labour markets provide incentives for members to commit themselves to the goals of 
continuous product and process improvement and the J-form tends to excel at incremental 
innovation.  
 
In summary, both the high performance and organisational design literatures draw a relation 
between the forms of work organisation adopted by a firm and its innovative style and capacity. In 
order to capture the diffusion across the EU of the main types of work organisation identified in 
these literatures, we use the Working Conditions survey data to construct 15 binary variables as 
presented in Table 1 below.
8  
                                                 
6 Mintzberg also refers to a third bureaucratic form, the ‘divisionalised’ form. Unlike the other four configurations, he 
describes it as a partial structure superimposed on others (i.e. divisions) each of which is driven towards the machine 
bureaucracy.  
7 The term J-form is used because its archetypical practices and forms of work organisation are best illustrated by the 
‘Japanese-type’ organisation discussed in the work of Aoki (1988) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). 
8 For the questions and coding used to construct the measures upon which the statistical analysis is based, see Appendix 
1. 
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 Table 1 
Work Organisation Variables 
  Percent of employees 
Team work  64.2 
Job rotation   48.9 
Responsibility for quality control   72.6 
Quality norms   74.4 
Problem solving activities   79.3 
Learning new things in work   71.4 
Complexity of tasks   56.7 
Discretion in fixing work methods   61.7 
Discretion in setting work pace  63.6 
Horizontal constraints on work pace   53.1 
Hierarchical constraints on work pace   38.9 
Norm-based constraints on work pace   38.7 
Automatic constraints on work pace   26.7 
Monotony of tasks   42.4 
Repetitiveness of tasks   24.9 
n 8081 
Source: Third Working Conditions survey, European Foundation for the Improvement of  
Living and Working Conditions 
 
Four of the variables measure the use of the core work practices identified in high performance 
work systems literature: team work, job rotation, employee responsibility for quality control, and 
precise quality norms. Two of the variables capture whether employees engage in learning and 
problem-solving which are characteristics of both adhocracies and the J-form. One question 
captures whether work tasks are complex or not and is relevant to the operating adhocracy. The 
forms of discretion in work that are characteristic of adhocracies are measured by two variables that 
capture whether employees are able to choose or change their work methods and their pace of work. 
Four variables measure different constraints on employee discretion in setting their pace of work: 
‘automatic’ constraints on work pace which is linked to the rate at which equipment is operated or a 
product is displaced in the production flow; ‘hierarchical’ constraints linked to the direct control 
which is exercised by ones immediate superiors; norm-based constraints on work pace linked to the 
setting of quantitative production norms; and ‘horizontal’ constraints linked to how one person’s 
work rate is dependent on the work of his or her colleagues. Hierarchical and automatic constraints 
are classic characteristics of taylorist work settings, while norm-based constraints characterise both 
taylorism and the Japanese forms of work organisation. The horizontal constraints variable provides 
  6a measure of whether work is carried out collectively rather than individually. Finally, the two 
variables measuring task repetitiveness and task monotony capture typical features of taylorist work 
settings. 
 
Variety in European organisational practice 
In order to assign employees to distinct categories or groups, we first undertake a factor analysis
9 to 
identify the underlying associations that exist among the 15 organisation variables described in 
Table 1. We then use the factor scores or the coordinates of the observations on the factors as a 
basis for clustering individuals into distinct groups of work systems, using Ward’s hierarchical 
clustering method. This allows us to distinguish between four basic systems of work organisation as 
presented in Table 2.
10 For example, 64.3% of all employees with a job subject to discretionary 
learning report team work.  
 
The first cluster, which account for 39 percent of the employees,
 11 is distinctive for the way high 
levels of autonomy in work are combined with high levels of learning, problem-solving and task 
complexity. The variables measuring constraints on work pace, monotony and repetitiveness are 
under-represented.  The use of team work is about at the average level for the population as a 
whole, while less than half of the employees in this cluster participate in job rotation which points 
to the importance of horizontal job specialisation. The forms of work organisation in this cluster 
correspond rather closely to those found in adhocracies and due to the combined importance of 
work discretion and learning we refer to this cluster as the ‘discretionary learning’ form.  
                                                 
9 The factor analysis method used here is multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) which is especially suitable for the 
analysis of categorical variables. Unlike principal components analysis where the total variance is decomposed along 
the principal factors or components, in multiple correspondence analysis the total variation of the data matrix is 
measured by the usual chi-squared statistic for row-column independence, and it is the chi-squared statistic which is 
decomposed along the principal factors. It is common to refer to the percentage of the ‘inertia’ accounted for by a 
factor. Inertia is defined as the value of the chi-squared statistic of the original data matrix divided by the grand total of 
the number of observations. See Benzecri, J.P. (1973); Greenacre (1993, pp. 24-31).  
10 For a graphical presentation of the positions of the centres of gravity of the clusters on the first two factors of the 
MCA, see Appendix 2.  
11 The percentages are weighted. 
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Table 2 
Work Organisation Clusters 
       








Taylorism  Traditional 
organisation 
Average
Team work  64.3  84.2 70.1  33.4 64.2 
Job rotation  44.0  70.5  53.2  27.5  48.9 
Quality norms  78.1  94.0  81.1  36.1  74.4 
Responsibility for quality control  86.4  88.7  46.7  38.9  72.6 
Problem solving activities  95.4  98.0  5.7  68.7  79.3 
Learning new things in work  93.9  81.7  42.0  29.7  71.4 
Complexity of tasks  79.8  64.7  23.8  19.2  56.7 
Discretion in fixing work methods   89.1  51.8  17.7  46.5  61.7 
Discretion in setting work rate  87.5  52.2  27.3  52.7  63.6 
Horizontal constraints on work rate  43.6  80.3  66.1  27.8  53.1 
Hierarchical constraints on work rate  19.6  64.4  66.5  26.7  38.9 
Norm-based constraints on work rate  21.2  75.5  56.3  14.7  38.7 
Automatic constraints on work rate  5.4  59.8  56.9  7.2  26.7 
Monotony of tasks  19.5  65.8  65.6  43.9  42.4 
Repetitiveness of tasks  12.8  41.9  37.1  19.2  24.9 




The second cluster accounts for 28 percent of the employees. Compared to the first cluster, work 
organisation in the second cluster is characterised by low levels of employee discretion in setting 
work pace and methods. The use of job rotation and team work, on the other hand, are much higher 
than in the first cluster, and work effort is more constrained by quantitative production norms and 
by the collective nature of work organisation. The use of quality norms is the highest of the four 
clusters and the use of employee responsibility for quality control is considerably above the average 
level for the population as a whole. These features point to a more structured or bureaucratic style 
of organisational learning that corresponds rather closely to the characteristics of the Japanese or 
‘lean production’ model associated with the work of MacDuffie and Krafcik (1992) and Womack et 
al. (1990).  
 
  8The third class, which groups 14 percent of the employees, corresponds in most respects to a classic 
characterisation of taylorism. The work situation is in most respects the opposite of that found in the 
first cluster, with low discretion and low level of learning and problem-solving. Interestingly, three 
of the core work practices associated with the lean production model – teams, job rotation and 
quality norms – are somewhat over-represented in this cluster, implying that these practices are 
highly imperfect measures of a transition to new forms of work organisation characterised by high 
levels of learning and problem-solving. The characteristics of this cluster draw attention to the 
importance of what some authors have referred to as ‘flexible taylorism’ (Boyer and Durand, 1993; 
Cézard, Dussert and Gollac, 1992; Linhart, 1994).  
 
The fourth cluster groups 19 percent of the employees. All the variables are underrepresented with 
the exception of monotony in work, which is close to the average.  The frequency of the two 
variables measuring learning and task complexity is the lowest among the four types of work 
organisation, while at the same time there are few constraints on the work rate. This class 
presumably groups traditional forms of work organisation where methods are for the most part 
informal and non-codified.  
 
In summary, the cluster analysis allowed us to identify three work organisation clusters whose 
features correspond rather closely to the forms of work organisation found, respectively, in 
adhocracies, J-form organisations, and machine bureaucracies or taylorist firms. It is important to 
emphasize that what our employee-level data allows us to capture is the adoption of different forms 
or work organisation within private sector firms in the EU and not the diffusion of particular types 
of firms or organisational archetypes. Thus, our results are fully consistent with the possibility that 
multiple forms of work organisation are being used within the same organisation. This, however, is 
consistent with what the empirical literature in the field of organisational behaviour and design 
shows. Pure organisational types are unlikely to found in the real world. As Lam (2005) observes, 
adhocracies are likely to be found in the creative sub-units of firms and may well be combined with 
other forms of work organisation. Osterman (1994) in his study of US firms classifies 'transformed' 
organisations as those which involve at least 50 percent of their employees in four core high 
performance work practices: teams, job rotation, quality circles, and total quality management.  
 
3. How Europe’s economies work and learn 
 
As the figures in Table 3 below show, the discretionary learning forms of work organisation are 
especially developed in several service sectors, notably business services and banks and insurance, 
  9and in the gas, electricity and water utilities. As one would anticipate, the lean model of production 
is more developed in the manufacturing sector, notably in the production of transport equipment, 
electronics and electrical production, wood and paper products, and printing and publishing. The 
taylorist forms are notably present in textiles, clothing and leather products, food processing, wood 
and paper products and transport equipment. The traditional organisational forms are to be found 
principally in the services, notably land transport, personal services, hotels and restaurants, post and 
telecommunications, and wholesale and retail trade. 
Table 3 
Forms of Work Organisation by Sector of Activity 
 
  Percent of employees by sector in each organisational class 







Mining and quarrying  42.4 41.5 3.4  12.7  100,0 
Food processing  18.4  34.9  24.6  22.1  100,0 
Textiles, garments, leather products 27.2  25.9  30.2  16.8  100,0 
Wood and paper products  27.6 40.7  23.9  7.8  100,0 
Publishing and printing  31.1  43.8  14.1  11.0  100,0 
Chemicals and plastics  34.7 34.1  21.9  9.2  100,0 
Metal products and mechanical engineering 31.8  35.7  19.8  12.7  100,0 
Electrical engineering and electronics 41.5 38.5 8.6  11.4  100,0 
Transport Equipment  28.1  38.7  23.2  10.0  100,0 
Other industrial production 50.9  22.1  18.4  8.5  100,0 
Electricity, gas and water 58.5  19.4  6.2  15.8  100,0 
Construction 40.9  31.4  10.6  17.1  100,0 
Wholesale and retail trade  41.5  20.4  11.7  26.4  100,0 
Hotels and restaurants 29.7  25.8  16.6  27.9  100,0 
Land transport  26.3  24.0  10.2  39.5  100,0 
Other transport   39.2  36.1  5.0  19.7  100,0 
Post and telecommunications 38.1  27.1  7.7  27.1  100,0 
Financial services  58.1 21.5 3.4  16.9  100,0 
Business services  57.6 18.7 6.9  16.7  100,0 
Personal services  39.7 18.9 7.6  33.8  100,0 
Average 39.1  28.2  13.6  19.1  100,0 
Source: Third Working Condition survey. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 
 
Table 4 provides evidence on variations in forms of work organisation according to occupational 
category. As one would expect, the  discretionary learning forms of work organisation are 
especially characteristic of the work of managers, professionals and technicians, while the lean 
forms of work organisation primarily characterises the work of employees in craft and related trades 
and machine operators and assemblers. The taylorist forms are most frequent amongst machine 
  10operators and the unskilled trades. Finally, the traditional forms of work organisation grouped in the 





Forms of Work Organisation according to Occupational Category 
 
  Percent of employees by occupational category in each organisational class 







Managers 69.1  24.7  0.2  6.0  100,0 
Engineers and professionals  75.9  14.0  5.2  4.9  100,0 
Technicians 61.0  24.6  2.4  12.0  100,0 
Clerks 43.2  21.9  9.4  25.5  100,0 
Service, shop & market sales persons  30.3  21.4  12.4  35.9  100,0 
Craft & related trades  34.2  38.5  16.5  10.8  100,0 
Machine operators & assemblers  15.7  37.7  24.3  22.3  100,0 
Unskilled  trades  14.8 23.9 26.7  34.5  100,0 
Average  39.1 28.2 13.6  19.1  100,0 
Source: Third Working Condition survey. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 
 
Establishment size constitutes a relatively unimportant factor in the use of different organisational 
models. The learning forms of work organisation are somewhat underrepresented in the medium-
size category of establishments (100 to 249 employees). The lean and taylorist forms increase with 
establishment size (> 250 employees) while the reverse tendency can be observed for the traditional 
forms of work organisation. 
 
In combination tables 2, 3 and 4 gives us a better idea of what the different clusters represent. 
Discretionary learning refers to jobs where a lot of responsibility is allocated to the employee who 
is expected to solve problems on her own. Business services is a typical example where many jobs 
involve a continuous confrontation with new and complex problems. Although some of the tasks 
take place in a team, teamwork is not seen as imposing narrow constraints on the work. In this 
category team-work may involve brain-storming by professional experts as much as collectively 
solving narrowly defined problems. 
 
Lean production also involves problem solving and learning but here the problems are more 
narrowly defined and the scale of possible solutions less broad. The work is highly constrained and 
  11it is often repetitive and monotonous. The extensive use of management techniques such as job 
rotation (between similar tasks within the same division) and team work may be seen as attempts to 
overcome the limits of taylorist production and to create some degree of active participation of 
production workers and sales staff in order to limit labour turnover and absenteeism. 
 
Taylorism is distinctive for low levels of learning and for the virtual absence of problem-solving 
activity. The work is highly constrained and monotonous. It may be seen as the old-style factory 
work where the tasks to solve are narrowly defined and repetitive. It is a kind of work where the 
required qualifications are limited and the worker can easily be substituted by another worker or by 
a machine. In the era of globalisation this category of work is interesting for two reasons. It is a 
kind of work where immigrants can be as productive as domestic workers but it is also the kind of 
work that is most easily outsourced to low wage countries. 
 
Traditional organisation involves even less complex problems. It is more individualistic than all the 
other categories and less monotonous than lean production and taylorism.  It includes traditional 
service jobs. Many of those involve a direct and indirect interaction with local customers and they 
may therefore be less foot-loose than the taylorist jobs. 
 
National effects on the diffusion of organisational practice 
 
Table 5 shows that there are wide differences in the importance of the four forms of work 
organisation across European nations. The discretionary learning forms of work organisation are 
most widely diffused in the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and to a lesser extent Germany and 
Austria, while they are little diffused in Ireland and the southern European nations. The lean model 
is most in evidence in the UK, Ireland, and Spain and to a lesser extent in France, while it is little 
developed in the Nordic countries or in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. The taylorist forms 
of work organisation show almost the reverse trend compared to the discretionary learning forms, 
being most frequent in the southern European nations and in Ireland and Italy. Finally, the 
traditional forms of work organisation are most in evidence in Greece and Italy and to a lesser 
extent in Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. 
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Table 5 
National Differences in Forms of Work Organisation 
 
  Percent of employees by country in each organisational class 
  Discretionary 
learning 
Lean production  Taylorist 
organisation 
Traditional 
organisation  Total 
Belgium 38.9 25.1 13.9 22.1  100.0 
Denmark 60.0  21.9  6.8  11.3  100.0 
Germany 44.3  19.6  14.3  21.9  100.0 
Greece 18.7  25.6  28.0  27.7  100.0 
Italy 30.0  23.6  20.9  25.4  100.0 
Spain 20.1  38.8  18.5  22.5  100.0 
France 38.0  33.3  11.1  17.7  100.0 
Ireland 24.0  37.8  20.7  17.6  100.0 
Luxembourg 42.8  25.4  11.9  20.0  100.0 
Netherlands 64.0  17.2  5.3  13.5  100.0 
Portugal 26.1 28.1 23.0 22.8  100.0 
United Kingdom  34.8  40.6  10.9  13.7  100.0 
Finland 47.8  27.6  12.5  12.1  100.0 
Sweden 52.6 18.5  7.1 21.7  100.0 
Austria 47.5  21.5  13.1  18.0  100.0 
EU-15 39.1  28.2  13.6  19.1  100.0 




As Tables 3 and 4 have shown, each form of work organisation tends to be associated with 
particular sectors and occupational categories. This raises the question of what part of the variation 
in the importance of these forms across EU nations can be accounted for by the nation’s specific 
industrial and occupational structure, or by other unexplained national factors that could influence 
the use of specific organisational forms. These unexplained national factors could include socio-
cultural attitudes on the part of management and workers, historical developments, and the rate at 
which new organisational forms are adopted by firms. In order to determine the importance of 
‘national factors’, we use logit regression analysis to provide estimates of the impact of national 
effects on the relative likelihood of adopting the different work models (See Table 6). Germany, the 
most populous nation within the EU, is the reference case for the estimates of national effects. In 
each case the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring whether or not the individual is 
subject to the particular form of work organisation. The independent variable for columns 1 through 
4 in Table 6 is a categorical variable for the 14 countries plus the reference category of Germany. 
  13Thus column 1 gives the likelihood that employees are subject to the ‘discretionary learning’ form 
of work organisation in each country relative to the German case.  
Table 6 
Logit Estimates of National Effects on Organisational Practice 
 
Logit estimates without structural controls  Logit estimates with structural controls 

















Belgium  -0.22 0.32  -0.03  0.01 -0.23 0.42*  -0.11  -0.09 
Denmark  0.63** 0.14  -0.82**  -0.79**  0.79** 0.29  -0.86**  -1.06** 
Greece  -1.24** 0.35  0.85**  0.31 -1.33** 0.42  0.84**  0.12 
Italy  -0.61** 0.24*  0.46**  0.20* -0.51** 0.20  0.33**  0.16 
Spain  -1.15** 0.96**  0.31*  0.04  -1.15** 1.08** 0.06  -0.17 
France  -0.26** 0.72**  -0.29*  -0.27**  -0.32** 0.84**  -0.33**  -0.38** 
Ireland  -0.92** 0.91** 0.45  -0.27  -1.11** 1.14** 0.47  -0.50 
Luxembourg  -0.06 0.33  -0.21  -0.11  -0.17 0.42  0.00  -0.20 
Netherlands  0.81** -0.16  -1.10**  -0.59**  0.79** 0.02  -0.94**  -0.74** 
Portugal  -0.81** 0.47**  0.58** 0.05  -0.78** 0.51** 0.44* -0.01 
UK  -0.40** 1.03**  -0.31**  -0.56**  -0.68** 1.32**  -0.24*  -0.72** 
Finland  0.14 0.45*  -0.15  -0.71*  -0.01 0.63**  -0.07  -0.78* 
Sweden  0.33* -0.07  -0.77**  -0.01 0.22 0.06  -0.68*  0.00 
Austria  0.13 0.12  -0.10  -0.24  0.33 0.14  -0.26  -0.43* 
*: significant at 5%       **: significant at 1%         Reference country: Germany 




Columns 5 through 8 present estimates of the relative likelihood of adopting the various forms of 
work organisation with structural controls. We have introduced three control variables 
corresponding to sector, establishment size and occupational category. The respective reference 
categories for the estimates are the vehicle sector, firms with 10 to 49 employees, and the 
occupational category of machine operator and assembler.  
 
As the column 1 results show, the country the employee works in has a significant impact on the 
relative likelihood of using the discretionary learning forms. Compared to the German case, for 
which the use of the discretionary learning forms of work organisation are near the 15-country 
weighted average (see Table 5 above), there are three countries where the learning model is more 
extensively used: Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. There are no significant differences in the 
  14use of discretionary learning in four countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland and Austria. The 
learning model is less in evidence in the remaining seven countries. Column 5 indicates that these 
results are robust after controlling for the effect of firm size, industry structure, and occupation, 
with the exception of Sweden, for which the coefficient estimate though still positive is no longer 
significant.  
 
Column 2 of Table 6 presents the estimates of national effects on the likelihood of using the lean 
forms without controls. Compared to Germany, where the use of the lean model is relatively low in 
relation to the 15-country weighted average (see Table 5), Spain, France, Ireland, Finland, the UK 
and Portugal display a relatively high propensity to use lean production methods. The coefficients 
are especially high for the UK, Ireland and Spain and they increase slightly and remain significant 
when structural controls are included.  
 
Overall, the results show that structural factors such as firm size, industry and occupation do not 
explain the marked national differences in the use of the different forms of work organisation. 
Instead, unexplained national factors that could be due to historically inherited management-worker 
relations or attitudes to organisational innovation strongly influence national differences in the use 
of different sets of organisational practices.  
 
These results suggest that as EU nations progressively have moved away from more traditional or 
hierarchical forms of work organisation and have sought to increase their capacity for learning and 
problem-solving, they have done this in different ways. Spain, the UK and Ireland stand out for 
their intensive use of the lean forms, while the Nordic nations and the Netherlands stand out for 
their use of the discretionary learning forms. Germany, Austria, France, Luxemburg and Belgium 
present a more balanced picture regarding the use of these two forms of work organisation each 
characterised by strong learning dynamics. The countries in the south of Europe are all weak in 
terms of discretionary learning. 
 
In so far as the organisational practices adopted by firms can influence their ability to develop and 
profit from innovation, the results in Table 6 suggest that the large differences within the European 
Union in national innovative performance
12 could partly be linked to national differences in the 
                                                 
12 As an example, the 2005 European Innovation Scoreboard finds a 2.5 fold difference between the best and worst EU-
15 member states on the Summary Innovation Index. 
  15distribution of different types of practices, particularly the use of discretionary learning forms that 
could maximize the opportunities for learning. This possibility is explored in sections 4 and 5. 
 
4. Measuring differences in innovation mode 
Economists and business scholars frequently measure innovation by R&D expenditures or by the 
number of patents applied for or granted. The weaknesses of these measures are well known. R&D 
doesn’t necessarily result in the development of new products or processes and many innovative 
firms do not perform R&D. A large fraction of innovations are not patented and the importance of 
patenting varies according to sector. Furthermore, R&D and patents entirely fail to capture 
innovation that occurs through diffusion processes, such as when a firm purchases innovative 
production equipment or product components from other firms. The Community Innovation 
Surveys (CIS) were in part designed to respond to these limitations by providing survey-based 
estimates of the percentage of manufacturing firms and selected service sector firms
13 that have 
developed or introduced a new product or process over a three-year time period. However, the CIS 
estimates of the percentage of innovative firms are based on a very broad definition of innovation 
ranging from intensive in-house R&D to develop a new-to-market product or process to minimal 
effort to introduce manufacturing equipment purchased from a supplier. Consequently, a broad all-
encompassing definition of an innovative firm is both misleading in international comparisons and 
fails to provide a clear picture of the structure of innovation capabilities within individual countries. 
 
In order to overcome these limitations, Arundel and Hollanders (2005), in collaboration with Paul 
Crowley of Eurostat, classified all innovative CIS respondent firms into four mutually exclusive 
innovation modes that capture different methods of innovating, plus a fifth group for non-
innovators.
14   
 
                                                 
13 CIS-3, used for determining innovation modes, did not include firms in several sectors covered in the Third Working 
Conditions Survey: construction (NACE 45) and service sectors as  retail trade (NACE 52), automobile trade and repair 
(NACE 50), hotels and restaurants (NACE 55),  some business services (NACE 74.1 and NACE 74.4 to 74.8), and 
personal services (NACE 90 to 93). CIS-3 did include wholesale trade (NACE 51). The main effect is that the CIS 
innovation modes data will underestimate the percentage of firms with traditional forms of work organisation (see Table 
3). 
14 Data are available for all EU member nations in 2000 with the exception of Ireland. The classification system is 
dependent on the types of variables available in the CIS and is limited to variables with a reasonably high response rate. 
For full details on the methodology for innovation modes, see Annex B of the Trend Chart document ‘EXIS: An 
Exploratory Approach to Innovation Scoreboards http://trendchart.cordis.lu/scoreboards/scoreboard2004/pdf/EXIS.pdf). 
  16The classification method uses two main criteria: the level of novelty of the firm’s innovations, and 
the creative effort that the firm expends on in-house innovative activities. The four innovation 
modes are as follows: 
  
Strategic innovators (21.9% of all innovative firms): For these firms, creative in-house innovative 
activities form an important part of the firm’s strategy. All firms have introduced a product or 
process innovation that they developed at least partly in-house, perform R&D on a continuous basis, 
introduced a new-to-market innovation, and are active in national or international markets. These 
firms are the most likely source of innovations that are later adopted or imitated by other firms. 
 
Intermittent  innovators (30.7% of all innovative firms): All of these firms develop innovations at 
least in part in-house and all have developed a new for the market innovation. But, they are less 
likely than the strategic innovators to have developed important innovations that diffuse to other 
firms, either because they are only active on local or regional markets, or because they only 
undertake innovative activities intermittently, say when required by the introduction of new product 
line.   
 
Technology modifiers (26.3% of all innovative firms): These firms primarily innovate through 
modifying technology developed by other firms or institutions. None of them perform R&D on 
either an occasional or continuous basis. Many firms that are essentially process innovators that 
innovate through in-house production engineering will fall within this group. 
 
Technology adopters (21.0% of all innovative firms): These firms do not develop innovations in-
house, with all innovations acquired from external sources. An example is the purchase of new 
production machinery. 
 
Table 7 presents the distribution of firms according to innovation mode for 14 EU nations for which 
the necessary data are available and also includes the percentage of firms that did not innovate. The 
results are weighted to reflect the distribution of all firms within the industry and service sectors 
covered by CIS-3. The results show that Finland, Germany and Luxembourg have the highest 
percentage of firms in the strategic and intermittent categories of innovators, while Germany, 
Luxembourg and Austria have the highest percentages of firms that are technology modifiers. In 
Spain, Greece, and the UK over 80% of firms are either adopters or non-innovators. 
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Table 7 
A Typology of Innovation Modes for EU Member Nations 
  Percentage of all firms by country in each innovation mode 









Belgium  7 13 16 14 50  100 
Denmark  5 14 11 14 56  100 
Germany  10 15 25 11 39  100 
Greece  4  9  5 10 72  100 
Italy  6 12 15  4 64  100 
Spain  2  6  5 19 67  100 
France  8 12 10 11 59  100 
Luxembourg  7 17 20  4 52  100 
Netherlands  8 14 16  8 55  100 
Portugal  3 15 16 13 54  100 
UK  4  7  5 16 68  100 
Finland  13 19 10  3 55  100 
Sweden  11 14 14  8 53  100 
Austria  8 12 20  9 51  100 
 
 
5. The relation between organisational practice and innovation mode 
As our introductory discussion pointed out, much of the discussion in the organisational behaviour 
literature on the relation between organisation and innovation focuses on whether or not particular 
organisational designs are better suited for undertaking radical or incremental innovations. The 
radical/incremental distinction is often seen as corresponding to the degree to which innovations are 
competence destroying as opposed to competence enhancing. For example, Lam (2005) and Lam 
and Lundvall (2006) argue that Mintzberg’s (1979, 1983) ‘operating adhocracy’ form of 
organisation, which relies on networks of professional experts and the creation of adhoc project 
teams, is especially adapted to novel or radical innovations characteristic of new emerging 
technologies. The firms of Silicon Valley provide good examples of this organisational form 
(Bahrami and Evans, 2000; Saxenian, 1996). In contrast, it is widely asserted in the literature on the 
Japanese firm that its organisational design is especially suited for progressive or incremental 
improvements in product quality and design. (Aoki, 1990; Coriat, 1991; Womack et. al, 1990). The 
Japanese organisation relies on firm-specific knowledge that is embedded in the firm’s 
  18organisational routines and relatively stable team structures for continuous product and process 
improvement.  
 
Since the business practices and forms of work organisation captured in our discretionary learning 
and lean clusters correspond rather closely to those that characterise the ‘operating adhocracy’ and 
the ‘Japanese-firm’, this literature led us to anticipate differences in the relative frequency of radical 
and incremental innovations in a nation depending on the relative frequency of diffusion of the 
discretionary learning and lean forms of work organisation. Developing empirical indicators to 
identify radical and incremental modes of innovation is problematic, however. Survey manuals, 
such as the Oslo Manual that provides the basis of the CIS questions, do not propose guidelines for 
how to measure radical innovations. This makes it difficult to bring survey-based evidence to bear 
on the various propositions developed in the organisational literature.  
 
Our typology of innovation modes captures a different but related distinction in the nature of 
innovation by distinguishing between firms that have developed, in-house, ‘new-to-market’ product 
or process innovations (particularly strategic innovators) versus firms that have only introduced 
‘new to firm’ innovations that were partly or entirely developed outside the firm (particularly 
technology modifiers and technology adopters). This distinction is not identical to the difference 
between radical and incremental innovations, since introducing a ‘new to the firm’ innovation that 
was originally developed elsewhere could require the firm to make radical changes to its mix of 
competences, while conversely a ‘new-to-market’ innovation need not be a radical innovation. 
However, there are large differences along the continuum between strategic innovators and 
technology adopters in each firm’s capacity to explore new knowledge, which is conceptually 
similar (although on a different scale) to the difference between radical and incremental 
innovations.  
 
In order to provide evidence that bears on the proposed link between organisational practice and 
innovation modes, we present a series of scatter plot diagrams showing the correlations between the 
frequency of the four innovation modes and the frequency of the discretionary learning and lean 
forms of work organisation for the 14 EU nations for which the data is available.   
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Percent  DL by percent  noninnovators
Correlations between % DL and innovation mode
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Figure 1 presents the results of this exercise for the discretionary learning (DL) forms. The main 
result is that there is a positive correlation between discretionary learning and the frequency of the 
two innovation modes for which the levels of novelty and creative in-house effort are the highest, 
the strategic and intermittent modes, while there is a negative correlation between discretionary 
learning and the frequency of non-innovators. Furthermore, the strongest positive correlation is 
between strategic innovators and discretionary learning, with 38% of the variation in the percentage 





Figure 2 presents the same analysis using the frequency of the lean organisational forms. The results 
tend to go in the opposite direction of those for discretionary learning. Thus they show a negative 
correlation between the frequency of the lean forms and the frequency of the three innovation 
modes which depend on in-house creative effort for innovation, and a positive correlation with the 
frequency of adopters and non-innovators.
16
 
These results provide support for the view that there are systemic links between the way work is 
organised in a nation and the distribution of different innovation modes.
17 More specifically, the 
positive correlations between discretionary learning and the strategic and intermittent innovator 
modes provide support for the hypothesis developed in the qualitative literature that the forms of 
work organisation characteristic of operating adhocracies support the exploration of new knowledge 
that is needed for creative, in-house innovative activities that lead to the development of new-to-
market innovations and possibly radical innovations.   
                                                 
15 The correlations between discretionary learning and strategic, intermittent and non-innovators are significant at the 
.05 level or better. The relatively weak correlations between discretionary learning and the frequency of modifiers 
(positive) and adopters (negative) are not significant at the .10 level. 
16 All these correlations are significant at the .05 level or better with the exception of the negative correlation between 
lean and the frequency of strategic innovators which is significant at the .10 level.  
17 The innovation modes are only weakly correlated with the frequency of the traditional forms of work organisation (R-
squared less than .10 in all cases). Strategic innovators are negatively correlated with the frequency of the taylorist 
forms (R-squared = .25, significant at the .10 level) and positively correlated with the frequency of non-innovators (R-
squared = .18 but not significant at the .10 level). The taylorist forms are only weakly correlated with the other three 
innovation modes (R-squared less than .10 in each case).  


































































































































































































Percent lean by percent  noninnovators
Correlations between % lean and innovation mode
 
 
  22While the negative correlations shown in Figure 2 between the lean forms of work organisation and 
the frequency of the strategic and intermittent innovator modes are consistent with our reading of 
the organisational design literature, the negative correlation with the frequency of modifiers is not. 
Based on the Japanese experience, we expected the frequency of the lean forms to be positively 
correlated with the prevalence of technology modifiers, which are dominated by innovation based 
on minor incremental improvements. Furthermore, the results in Table 2 show that employees 
subject to the lean forms of work organisation report above rates of problem solving and learning. 
Nevertheless, the negative correlation with the frequency of technology modifiers is the highest 
observed (R
2 value of 0.47) while the lean forms are positively correlated with the prevalence of 
firms that either do not innovate or which only innovate through adopting new technology. Firms 
grouped in this latter category do not need to invest very much in exploring new knowledge in order 
to innovate
18.   
 
The lack of a positive correlation between the lean forms and the prevalence of technology 
modifiers could be due to limitations with the data, but an alternative possibility is that the lean 
model could have been adopted by European firms as a more efficient alternative to Taylorism, 
without adopting the Japanese emphasis on the delegation of decision-making responsibility to 
shop-floor employees. Under these conditions, the problem solving and learning tasks reported by 
employees subject to lean organisation could be severely limited by the high prevalence of reported 
constraints (see Table 2), limiting opportunities to suggest or implement incremental 
improvements.
19 If true, the restrictions on lean organisational forms could explain part of the 
innovation performance gap between Europe and Japan. In the following section we turn to some of 
the ‘unexplained national factors’ that may influence why organisational practice varies by nation 
and the implications of this for innovation.  
 
                                                 
18 Some investment in learning will nevertheless be required, either to select new technology to adopt, or even to decide 
whether or not to innovate in a given time period. 
19 The vast literature on the transfer of Japanese management practices by Japanese multinationals to their affiliates 
located in Europe and the US and during the 1980s and 1990s provides evidence relevant to this issue. Most of this 
literature argues that Japanese management practices are modified in the process of transfer resulting in hybrid 
organisational forms combining elements of work organisation and HRM practices characteristic of the host country. 
See Kenney and Florida,1993; Liker et al. 1992; and Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992. For evidence on the limited 
delegation of decision-making authority to shop floor personnel in Japanese transplants located in the UK, see Lorenz, 
2000; and Doeringer et al. 2003. 
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6. National factors and organisational forms  
 
While the discretionary learning and lean forms of work organisation both depend on the capacities 
of their employees for learning and problem-solving, the former is correlated with in-house 
innovative capabilities while the latter is only correlated with technology adoption. This raises two 
questions: what unexplained national factors promote the use of discretionary learning, and what 
national factors constrain problem solving under lean organisational forms?  
 
Education is clearly a factor. In nations where discretionary learning is widely diffused, there 
should be a tendency to invest more in the training of employees.  Investments in training develop 
the firm and industry-specific skills of new entrants to the labour market. Life-long learning can 
also play a critical role in adapting the skills and knowledge of more mature employees’ to the 
requirements of on-going changes in products and technology. 
 
Some support for this proposition can be derived from Figure 3 which shows a strong positive 
correlation between the frequency of discretionary learning and the percentage of enterprises 
providing training to their employees. The figure also points to a possible north/south divide within 
Europe. The four less technologically developed southern nations are characterised by both low 
levels of enterprise training and low use of discretionary learning, while the more developed 
northern and central European nations are characterised by relatively high levels of enterprise 
training and by high level use of the discretionary learning forms.  






















































% enterprises training by % dicretionary learning
 
Source: Continuing Vocational Education Survey, 1999 (Newcronos, Eurostat) 
 
Figure 3 points to one anomaly: the UK is the only country within the group of high training nations   
that uses the lean forms more extensively than the discretionary learning forms (see Table 5). One 
possibility is that there are unique ‘unexplained’ factors at work in the UK that influence firms 
choices of organisational forms. Although it is very difficult to determine what these factors might 
be, a few clues are provided by Figures 4 and 5 below. Figure 4 shows the relation between the 
frequency of discretionary learning and an indicator of the strength of a nation’s system of 
unemployment protection. Figure 5 shows the relation between the frequency of discretionary 
learning and an indicator of the level of national ‘social capital’. 
 
Figure 4 indicates that there is a positive relation between the frequency of discretionary learning 
and the proportion of in-work income being maintained by someone becoming unemployed.
20 One 
way to interpret this result has to do with the limited tenures that employees often experience in 
organisations that compete on the basis of strategies of continuous knowledge exploration. As Lam 
(2005, p. 128) has observed in her discussion of the operating adhocracy, in such organisations the 
mix of required skills and competences continuously evolves, and careers tend to be structured 
  25around a series of discrete projects rather than advancing within an intra-firm hierarchy. As a result, 
this kind of organisation has relatively porous organisational boundaries so as to permit the 
insertion of new knowledge and ideas from the outside.  In such a context strong systems of 
unemployment protection can offer two complementary benefits. First, in terms of incentives, the 
security such systems provide in terms of income maintenance can encourage individuals to commit 
themselves to what would otherwise be perceived as unacceptably risky forms of employment and 
career paths. Secondly, such forms of protection can contribute to the longer term accumulation of 
knowledge for particular sectors or regions since in their absence unemployed workers would be 
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Source: Benefits and Wages, OECD (2004, p. 103) 
 
Figure 5 shows a positive relation between the relative frequency of discretionary learning and a 
measure of the level of generalised trust in a nation that is commonly used in the literature on social 
capital and productivity growth.
21 The measure of trust is based on a question used in the World 
                                                                                                                                                                  
20 The figures presented in Figure 4 are the net replacement rates of in-work income over 60 months averaged across 
four family types and two income levels for persons eligible for social assistance. See OECD, Benefits and Wages, 
2004, p. 103.  
21 See La Porta et al., 1997; Knack and Kneefer, 1997; and Zak and Knack, 1998. 
  26Values Survey in the 1999-2000 wave which provided information on 29 market economies.
22 The 
question used is: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ For the EU 15, the percentage of the respondents 
saying that most people can be trusted ranged from a low of 12.3 percent for Portugal to a high of 























































Social capital and dicretionary learning
 
World Values Survey, 1999-2000.  
 
One way to interpret these results is that high levels of trust support high levels of autonomy in 
work whereas low levels of trust tend to give rise to relatively rule-bound and hierarchical forms of 
organisation. Trust supports autonomy in work for two related reasons. The first pertains to a 
standard issue raised in the principal-agent literature. The principal (employer) may be unwilling to 
give the agent (employee) large levels of discretion in work and rely on his or her good intentions in 
the absence of trust. This would be especially true of employees engaged in processes of knowledge 
creation which are by their nature complex and uncertain and thus difficult to monitor. The second 
has to do with the willingness of employees to bear risk. The outcomes of knowledge creation 
activities are by their nature uncertain and while the forms of autonomy in work which support such 
creative work may be of intrinsic value to employees they also increase individual responsibility 
and raise the question of fair treatment in the event of failure. Employees will be more prepared to 
                                                 
22 See: www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
  27bear these risks in setting characterised by high levels of trust. Of course even in low-trust national 
settings individual employers can adopt specific human resources policies to foster such trust which 
more or less goes against the national grain. But such trust will be much easier to foster and sustain 
in national settings where the presumption is that others can be trusted. Another way of saying this 
is that high levels of generalised trust in a society spill-over to the work place and have effects on 
relations of cooperation. 
 
These considerations suggest that the UK’s distinctive emphasis on the use of the lean over the 
discretionary learning forms of work organisation may reflect the way low levels of generalised 
trust combine with a weak system of unemployment protection to encourage the adoption of 
bureaucratic and rule-bound forms of organisation.  Of course, institutional settings favourable to 
the adoption of the discretionary learning forms are not entirely absent in the UK. However, they 
tend to be found in only a few isolated contexts, such as the cluster of high-technology firms around 
the University of Cambridge, where localised networks of firms provide the necessary ‘social 





In this paper we have demonstrated that there is a close connection between how people work and 
learn in a country and the way firms’ innovate. In countries where a big proportion of the labour 
force are engaged in activities that offer them some discretion in organising their work and that 
involve problem-solving and learning the frequency of ‘endogenous’ innovation is high. A high 
frequency of workers engaged in ‘lean production’ where work is highly constrained does not 
promote innovation. Management techniques such as job rotation, team working and quality 
control may be part of the successful Japanese model for incremental innovation. Our data indicate 
that in Europe these forms do not necessarily stimulate endogenous innovation. It seems as if they 
need to be combined with some degree of discretion in order to do so. 
 
Though based on simple correlations that cannot establish a causal relation, these results suggest 
that European policy efforts to improve innovation performance as part of the revised Lisbon 
strategy need to take a close look at the effect of organisational practice on innovation. The 
bottleneck to improving the innovative capabilities of European firms might not be low levels of 
R&D expenditures, which are strongly determined by industry structures and consequently difficult 
to change, but the widespread presence of working environments that are unable to provide a fertile 
  28environment for innovation. If this is the case, then the next step for European policy is to 
encourage the adoption of ‘pro-innovation’ organisational practice, particularly in countries with 
poor innovative performance. In this respect a better understanding of how the ‘unexplained’ 
national factors influence firms’ organisational choices could be essential. Some examples of 
possible factors have been sketched out in Section 6. 
 
The next step in more adequately addressing the relation between organisation and innovation is to 
obtain complementary firm-level data on both innovation modes and organisational forms. Our 
results provide a few tentative hypotheses that are consistent with the evidence and which could be 
explored when better data are available. One option is to develop better indicators of organisational 
innovation in future CIS surveys, as proposed by the third revision of the Oslo Manual in 2005. The 
CIS could respond to some of the limitations inherent in relying on the employee-level data of the 
European Survey  on Working Conditions by supplying establishment-level data providing 
information on the way knowledge flows and knowledge sharing are organised within firms and 
how they relate to other aspects of corporate strategy.  
 
We hope our results will widen the debate and stimulate further comparative research exploring the 
links between organisational forms, innovative performance, and the institutional context within 
Europe. 
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Team work  1 if your job involves doing all or part of 
your work in a team, 0 otherwise 
 
64,2 
Job rotation  1 if your job involves rotating tasks between yourself  
and colleagues, 0 otherwise 
48,9 
Quality norms  1 if your main paid job involves meeting precise quality 
standards, 0 otherwise 
74,4 
Discretion in fixing work 
methods 
1 if you are able to choose or change your methods of 
work, 0 otherwise 
61,7 
Discretion in setting 
work pace 
1 if you are able to choose or change your pace of work, 
0 otherwise 
63,6 
Horizontal constraints on 
work pace 
1 if on the whole your pace of work is dependent on the 
work of your colleagues, 0 otherwise 
53,1 
Hierarchical constraints 
on work pace 
1 if on the whole your pace of work is dependent on the 
direct control of your boss,  0 otherwise 
38,9 
Norm-based constraints 
on work pace 
1 if on the whole your pace of work is dependent on the 
numerical production targets, 0 otherwise 
38,7 
Automatic constraints on 
work pace 
1 if on the whole your pace of work is dependent on the 
automatic speed of a machine or movement of a 
product, 0 otherwise 
26,7 
Employee responsibility 
for quality control 
1 if the employee’s main paid job involves assessing 





1 if your job involves solving unforeseen problems on 
your own, 0 otherwise
 
79.3 
Learning new things  1 if your job involves learning new things on your own, 
0 otherwise 
71,4 
Task Complexity  1 if your job involves complex tasks, 0 otherwise  56,7 
Task monotony  1 if your job involves monotonous tasks, 0 otherwise   42,4 
Task repetitiveness  1 if your work involves short repetitive tasks of less 
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Graphical Representation of Factor Analysis - 15 Organisational Variables  














































   Xxx : presence of the characteristic 
_Xxx: absence of the characteristic          
  Dscrm: autonomy in work methods        
  Dscrc: Autonomy in work speed            
   Learn: learning new things                    
   Pbsolv:  probelms solving activity         
   Complx: complex tasks                         
   QC: responsibility for quality control      
                                                                
 
QN: precise quality norms 
Team: team work 
Rot: job rotation 
Mono: task monotony 
Rep: task repetiveness 
Flowc: automatic constraints on work pace 
Nrmc: quantitative norm constraints on work pace 
Hierc: hierarchical constraints on work pace 
Horc: horizontal constraints on work pace 
 
The figure above presents graphically the first two axes or factors of the multiple correspondence 
analysis (MCA). The first factor or axis, accounting for 18% of the inertia or chi-squared statistic, 
distinguishes between taylorist and ‘post-taylorist’ organisational forms. Thus on one side of the 
  34axis we find the variables measuring autonomy, learning, problem-solving and task complexity and 
to a lesser degree quality management, while on the other side we find the variables measuring 
monotony and the various factors constraining work pace, notably those linked to the automatic 
speed of equipment or flow of products, and to the use of quantitative production norms. The 
second factor or axis, accounting for 15% of the chi-squared statistic, is structured by two groups of 
variables characteristic of the lean production model: first, the use of teams and job rotation which 
are associated with the importance of horizontal constraints on work pace; and secondly those 
variables measuring the use of quality management techniques which are associated with what we 
have called ‘automatic’ and ‘norm-based’ constraints. The third factor, which accounts for 8 percent 
of the chi-squared statistic, is also structured by these two groups of variables. However, it brings 
into relief the distinction between on the one hand those organisational settings characterised by 
team work, job rotation and horizontal interdependence in work, and on the other hand those 
organisational settings where the use of quality norms, automatic and quantitative norm-based 
constraints on work pace are important. The second and third axes of the analysis demonstrate that 
the simple dichotomy between taylorist and lean organisational methods is not sufficient for 
capturing the organisational variety that exists across European nations. 
 
The projection of the centre of gravity of the four organisational clusters coming out of the 
hierarchical classification analysis (see Table 2) onto the graphic representation of the first two 
factors of the MCA shows that the four clusters correspond to the quite different working 
conditions. The discretionary learning cluster is located to the east of the graph, the lean cluster to 
the south, the taylorist cluster to the west and the traditional cluster to the north. 
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